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I. Introduction
Protecting a client's proprietary business information from
intentional or inadvertent disclosure during pretrial discovery is of
paramount importance in modern federal litigation. Attorneys
representing trade secret owners often use the stipulated protective
order as a way of ensuring that the discoverable trade secrets remain
confidential before, during, and after trial.
However, a quiet battle has been raging in the circuits over the
propriety of these private agreements. On the one hand, litigants see
a stipulated protective order as the best way to protect their trade
secrets in a federal court system that has increasingly applied a public
right of access to discovery materials not used in a judicial
proceeding. Allied with them are district court judges, who see
stipulated protective orders as a way to increase court efficiency.2
J.D., UC Hastings College of the Law, 2001.
1. Citizens First Nati. Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945-46
(7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the circuits reach different conclusions under different
reasoning when considering, ratifying, or modifying stipulated protective orders).
2. One district judge, after deciding that a stipulated protective order could not be
Judges are reluctant to over-scrutinize an agreement between
opponents, especially if the alternative is making a good cause
determination on a document-by-document basis, or at best, based on
a class of documents.3 In any case, the trial judge faces a daunting task
in modern complex civil litigation without a protective order.
On the other side are the circuit courts, who criticize district
judges for "rubberstamping"' an agreement that is often
"standardless, stipulated, permanent, frozen, [and] overbroad."5
Circuits see this as abdicating trial court discretion, and valuing court
efficiency above the longstanding right of the American public to
inspect their court system.6 The frequent overruling of protective
orders, sometimes years after they were issued, reduces litigants' faith
in their own agreements.7 This may encourage litigants to seek even
tighter control over the fruits of discovery.8 Circuits also see
relied on to protect a deposition without an explicit showing of good cause, stated:
If courts were obliged to make determinations, item by item, as to the justification for
confidentiality of every piece of [discovery produced] ... there would be little time in
which to do anything else.... The issue whether the material really should be kept
[confidential], is left for another day, which fortunately seldom arrives - a circumstance
that spares the courts much time which may be devoted to other litigants and the parties
many dollars that otherwise would be spent litigating academic questions.
Greater Miami Baseball Club Ltd. Partn. v. Selig, 955 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
3. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1123 (3d Cir. 1986).
4. The Sixth Circuit roundly criticized a trial court for allowing litigants to
"adjudicate their own case based upon their own self-interest," stating:
The District Court cannot abdicate its responsibility to oversee the discovery process and
to determine whether filings should be made available to the public. It certainly should not
turn this function over to the parties, as it did here, allowing them to modify the terms of a
court order without even seeking the consent of the court. The protective order in this
case allows the parties to control public access to court papers, and it should be vacated or
substantially changed.
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996). See also
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d Cir. 1994), where the court opined:
"Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign orders that contain confidentiality clauses
without considering the propriety of such orders, or the countervailing public interests
which are sacrificed by the orders."
5. Citizens First Natl. Bank, 178 F.3d at 946 (remanding a stipulated protective order
for good cause determination).
6. Attorney's Stipulated Protective Order Is Unacceptable, 6 Fed. Discovery News
(Nov. 13, 2000) (Judge quoted as saying, "[T]he general rule in the federal system is still
freedom of information," and that protective orders are still an "exceptional form of
relief" when he refused to accept an order proposed by the parties in Bryan v. The Pep-
Boys, No. 00-1525 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2000)).
7. Circuits take a dim view of these blanket agreements because "they are by nature
overinclusive and are, therefore, peculiarly subject to modification." Pub. Citizen v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 790 (1st Cir. 1988).
8. In deciding a post-settlement challenge to a protective order, the First Circuit
wrote: "The plaintiffs' underlying product liability claim has been settled. The discovery
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stipulated protective orders as contributing to the general perception
that courts operate in secret, and large, powerful defendants can
manipulate the system to prevent disclosure of their wrongdoing -
especially when it affects public health and safety issues.
The confusion in district courts exists because the circuits
disagree about the legal reasoning-to apply when considering if, when,
and why a stipulated protective order should issue under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.9 Part 11"° describes how and why parties
seek a blanket stipulated protective order. Part 111" will explore the
Second Circuit s12 statutory presumption of public access to discovery
approach, based on a construction of the interplay between the
former Rules 5(d) and 26(c) as announced in In Re "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation.3 This Note will explore whether the
Agent Orange presumption can be supported under the December,
2000 revision of Rule 5(d), and whether the presumption is a
misapplication of the common law right of access to judicial records
doctrine. In Part IV, 4 this Note proposes an approach like that
followed by the First 5 and Third 16 Circuits. These circuits recognize
that the common law right to access judicial records does not attach
to discovery materials not used in a judicial proceeding, and reject a
statutory presumption of public access.
If this approach is followed, the heightened protection against
discovery access will better protect a litigant who is forced to reveal a
sensitive trade secret during discovery from disclosure to non-parties,
thereby reducing the need for a protective order. If further protection
beyond that granted by common law is necessary, this Note proposes
that Rule 26(c) protective orders should issue on a showing of good
dispute lives on, consuming the time and energy of the courts, largely as a contest between
plaintiffs' counsel and the defendant-appellee ..." Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d
527, 529 (1st Cir. 1993).
9.. Throughout this note, "the Rules" refers to the current Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, "the former Rules" refers to the 1993 version, and "the revised Rules" refers
to the December, 2000 revision.
10. See infra nn. 18-46 and accompanying text.
11. See infra nn. 47-87 and accompanying text.
12. See In Re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987). Other
circuits, most notably the Seventh Circuit in Citizens First Natl. Bank, 178 F.3d 943, have
followed the Second Circuit's lead by citing Agent Orange as precedent.
13. Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 138.
14. See infra nn. 88-125 and accompanying text.
15. Pub. Citizen, 858 F.2d at 791; Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir.
1986).
16. Cipollone, 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986).
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cause. Part V 7 explores what showing need be made in such cases.
II. The Blanket Stipulated Protective Order'8
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, originally adopted in 1938,
codified a relatively new litigation concept called discovery.'9 The
Rules' civil discovery regime deliberately permitted liberal discovery
to allow parties to narrow contested issues and find the truth before
trial. Discovery under the Rules favors private resolution of discovery
disputes,0 and allows litigants to tailor their pretrial discovery
through private agreements.2' The court purposely plays a "hands-
off" role during discovery, and is generally not involved unless its
discretion is invoked by a party.2 Thus, discovery under the Rules
works to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.""
A trade secret in an infringement case is virtually guaranteed to
be discoverable because Rule 26(b) 24 places a low relevance threshold
on what a party can discover from an opponent. This low relevance
standard will produce much other "raw" information, including
hearsay, rumors, raw data, notes, information possibly damaging to
third parties, etc. Such information is potentially inaccurate,
17. See infra nn. 126-40 and accompanying text.
18. For examples of blanket stipulated protective orders, see Leucadia Inc. v. Applied
Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 159 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1993).
19. Before the Rules were enacted, and in English common law, the pleading process
served a discovery function of sorts. The Rules codified general discovery standards in
Rule 26.
20. For instance, litigants cannot make a Rule 26(c) protective order motion until
they can provide the court with "a certification that the movant has in good faith
conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the
dispute without court action .... Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (2003).
21. See e.g. Rule 26(f), which allows parties to change the "timing, form, or
requirement for disclosures," or to agree to what "limitations should be imposed" on the
discovery process. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. George Hyman Const. Co., 155
F.R.D. 113, 116 n. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1994), which held that parties have the ability to stipulate
among themselves to whatever confidentiality they "reasonably, lawfully, and ethically"
conclude is appropriate.
22. An exception is the Rule 16 requirement that a discovery conference be held.
23. Rule 1.
24. Rule 26(b)(1) was revised in December, 2000, and the 2000 revision raised the
relevance threshold from the former "subject matter relevance" standard. After the 2000
revision, "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party .... Despite the use of stronger language in
the revised Rule 26(b)(1), the Rule still dictates a lower relevance standard than that
required by other Federal Rules such as Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Moreover,
notwithstanding the higher relevance standard, trade secrets are still discoverable under
the new Rule 26(b)(1).
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misleading, irrelevant, or inadmissible at trial, Moreover, such raw
information may refer to the trade secret itself, or contain enough
information to reconstruct it. In the process of handing over many
documents, a party may accidentally include the trade secret among
the documents.
Parties commonly use the stipulated protective order when
seeking to avoid disclosure of their trade secrets during discovery. 5
During the discovery planning stage, the party seeking protection
proposes an agreement to protect the trade secret's confidentiality.
Such agreements may require the opponent to refrain from disclosing
the secret to third parties, or, if the opponent is a business competitor,
from using the secret to their competitive advantage. These
agreements may be very specific in their description of who has access
to the fruits of discovery,26 and usually include in the agreement the
proviso that discovery is protected from access by non-parties.
The sheer volume of discovery in a modern, complex,
commercial case may increase the likelihood parties will agree to the
stipulated protective order." If the case will produce a heavy volume
of discovery, parties may propose a "blanket" protective order to
avoid a document-by-document examination of discovery. Typical
blanket orders purport to cover all discovery produced by a party, or
may allow a party to unilaterally declare discovered information
confidential.
Once the parties agree to terms of a protective order, the party
seeking confidentiality motions the court under Rule 26(c), and
presents the agreement as a stipulation. The movant also provides the
25. Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 857-58 (7th Cir. 1994).
26. For example, in The Beam Sys., 1.997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8812 at *12 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 5, 1997), the court ruled that disclosing software core to plaintiff's expert, who had an
undisclosed business relationship with the plaintiff, was improper since the expert would
not qualify as "independent". As such, the court precluded the expert from testifying at
trial. The word "[i]ndependent" was defined very specifically by the court as:
"[N]ot dependent" on a party, "not affiliated" with a party, "not subject to the control of
influence" of a party, and "lacking a social or business relationship" with a party. Mere
technical non-employee status obviously is not enough to satisfy the requirement of
independence, especially the software industry [sic], in which the use of independent
contractors is widespread. If mere technical non-employee status were sufficient, the
requirement of independence could be easily circumvented.
27. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 874 n. 6, 889
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (noting that litigants in most cases of "a modicum of complexity" agree to
a stipulated protective orders which are later court-approved, and that 35 million
documents were produced in the instant case). See also Jepson, 30 F.3d at 858 (stipulated
protective orders are relatively common).
28. The party declaring information confidential is held to a good faith standard. See
Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 159.
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court with affidavits that good cause exists to justify the order under
26(c). It is unlikely the court will refuse to ratify such agreements
under its Rule 26(c) power.29
Blanket protective orders, however, have been increasingly
criticized by the circuits and the general public. These blanket
stipulated protective orders may to rise to the level of abuse because
they are frequently the product of a devil's bargain. When the party
proposing the agreement is a large, well-funded defendant, 3 it can
threaten to challenge a smaller plaintiff's discovery every step of the
way. Unless they sign the agreement, the plaintiff faces lengthy and
expensive discovery litigation. If the agreement refers to
maintaining confidentiality beyond the pretrial stage, or extends into
the trial or beyond, it can raise serious public policy and First
Amendment questions.32 All too often plaintiffs in this situation
choose to agree rather than expend significant resources on litigating
discovery motions.33
Plaintiffs' attorneys expend time and money obtaining discovery,
and feel it increases efficiency if they can share their discovery with
other potential plaintiffs similarly situated,34 or use this discovery to
29. "[T]he court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person .. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). One
commentator noted that "it is the rare judge who questions the terms of an agreement
between the parties ending the litigation." C. Thomas Dienes, Newsgathering and the Law
254 (2d ed., LEXIS Pblg., 1999). Despite trial court grumbling and frequent overruling on
appeal, judges routinely ratify stipulated protective orders. See e.g. Hayden v. Appleton
Papers, Inc., No. 86-5232 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Bryan v. Eichenwald, et al., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4317 (D. Kan. Mar. 30, 2000) (overturned on appeal due to abuse of discretion by
lower court in approving stipulated protective order just because all parties agreed);
Rutigliano v. Valley Business Forms, 2000 WL 1705152 (D. N.J. Oct. 6, 2000).
30. For a description of how defendants who are manufacturers overuse the
stipulated protective order, thereby increasing their own costs of litigation and exercising
unethical behavior, see C. Neal Pope & R. Timothy Morrison, On the Limits of Discovery;
How the Defense Abuses Protective Orders, The Recorder 7 (Aug. 21, 1992). Cf. Rex
Linder, Assault on Protective Orders: President's Page, 66 Def. Counsel J. 165 (April 1,
1999) (arguing that stipulated protective orders lower costs to litigants and that mutual
confidentiality protects all litigants).
31. For an overview of how the discovery process is abused, see Warren Freedman,
The Tort of Discovery Abuse 109-14 (Quorum Books, 1989).
32. Although First Amendment concerns have been raised over the years, Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart conclusively settled the matter with regard to pretrial restrictions.
467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (holding that pretrial protective orders do not raise a First
Amendment prior restraint issue).
33. See e.g. De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 138 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (noting that
protective orders were designed to reduce pretrial litigation, not add to it).
34. See Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 535 (noting that "effective discovery, with a minimum of
disputes, is achieved by affording relatively generous protection to discovery material"
and by preventing plaintiffs' attorney from using discovery obtained in instant case from
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identify potential plaintiffs against the same or similar defendants.35
Even with a protective order, a resourceful plaintiffs' attorney may
find discovery has entered the judicial record, making protective
orders that cover trial and post-trial periods necessary.36 On the other
hand, defendant manufacturers of similar products may find that
sharing discovery helps an entire industry to fight suits by plaintiffs
who are injured by the industry's products. 7
Circuit courts are increasingly sensitive to the charge that the
judiciary functions behind a veil of secrecy." The perception is that
well-funded, savvy defendants can manipulate the court process to
keep material that is potentially damaging to their reputations from
being published in the media.36 Public interest groups" charge that
information vital to the public's health and safety comes out during
discovery, but may be forever inaccessible when covered by a
stipulated protective order.41  Some have proposed "sunshine"
legislation in Congress, which would make all discovery and trial
documents public.42
Circuits are critical of district judges who ratify a blanket
stipulated protective agreement, because of the increasingly prevalent
view that the goals of discovery can best be fulfilled when discovery is
being used in other suits against same company due to existence of protective order).
35. Id. at 534 (plaintiffs' attorney not allowed to use discovery to uncover other
potential plaintiffs against same defendant).
36. Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics, 174 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 1999)
(protective order from previous case required plaintiff's trade secret to be purged from
public record, but defendant in second case discovered description of trade secret in
unsealed court file of the first case; summary judgment denied by court, which held that
unintended disclosure did not constitute publication of trade secret).
37. This situation comes up in product liability cases, and especially in cigarette
litigation. See e.g. Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1115.
38. Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 485 (3d Cir. 1995) ("In [another
case], we emphasized the strong public interest in open proceedings.... The sharing of
information among current and potential litigants is furthered by open proceedings.").
39. Litigation against cigarette manufacturers provides many examples of this
situation. See e.g. Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1109 (cigarette manufacturer unsuccessfully tried
to block information about inadequate cigarette labeling from reaching the media, arguing
it was covered by a blanket stipulated protective order).
40. See e.g. Public Citizen, Inc. Joins Battle to Force Disclosure of Carbonless Copy
Facts, 9 Mealey's Emerging Toxic Torts (Aug. 18, 2000).
41. See e.g. James Gill, Shintech and the Eggheads, The Times-Picayune B7. (Feb. 25,
1998) (risk of contamination from proposed Shintech factory maintained as confidential
information: "To admit the truth ... would be smarter 'community relations."').
42. Stephen Morrison, Protective Orders and Confidentiality Agreements: They Need
Protecting from Legislators, 66 Def. Counsel J. 248 (1999) (noting that "[a]ny legislation
that would have the effect or restricting the ability of courts to issue protective orders and
confidentiality agreements should be carefully considered.").
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open to non-parties.43  Circuits claim that blanket stipulated
protective agreement ratification under Rule 26(c) abdicates this
Rule's requirement that the court find "good cause" for entering the
order." Appeal courts are sending these types of agreements back to
the district for determination of whether good cause can be shown to
support the order.
There seems to be a consensus that the current system needs
fixing." However, some of the frustration with blanket stipulated
protective orders arises because districts do not have clear direction
from circuits as to the legal basis for granting a Rule .26(c) protective
order, or as to exactly what the rights of non-parties are with regard
to discovery fruits.
43. Wilk v. Am. Med. Assn., 635 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1980)
44. Citizens First Natl. Bank, 178 F.3d at 946.
45. See e.g. USA Tech., Inc. v. Alphanet Hospitality Sys., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8120 at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1999) (stipulated protective order impermissibly vested in the
parties the discretion to determine which documents were confidential, and that
"substantial satellite litigation" was subsequently created by third parties to compel
disclosure); Public Has No Constitutional Right to Access Discovery Documents, 6 Fed.
Discovery News (Aug. 15, 2000) (Judge declined to modify a stipulated protective order in
Doe v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 103 F. Supp. 2d 856 (D. Md. 2000) because "the 20,000
pages of [documents produced during discovery] ... had never been filed with the court",
and without blanket protective orders "the court would "easily become a slave to the
details of considering the confidentiality of individual documents.").
46. Gail Diane Cox, P&G Peddles a Private Patent Court, The Natl. L.J., Corporate
Brief B1 (1998). Procter and Gamble's in-house counsel, Patrick Lane, proposed a private
patent resolution court, citing frustration with federal court delays and expense in
litigating patent disputes. In the proposed non-binding "court," little discovery would be
allowed.
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III. The Second Circuit's Approach: The Former Rules
Created a Statutory Presumption That Discovery is Publicly
Accessible
Underlying the discussion of blanket stipulated protective orders
lurks the longstanding common law tradition that judicial proceedings
are open to the public." This public access extends to the right "to
inspect and copy public records and documents,"" including the
judicial records of civil cases. 9 This right, "which antedates the
Constitution and which is now applicable in both criminal and civil
cases, is now 'beyond dispute."'' 0 Because common law recognized
no discovery as such, pleading served the essentially same function."
The trial record did not begin until final pleadings were filed, so the
right of access did not match to the pleadings until they were finalized
and filed with the court." Thus, a difference was recognized between
material analogous to raw discovery, and materials used in a
substantive motion or entered as evidence during trial. 3
Under the common law, once discovery enters the judicial
record, the court has (and retains) the affirmative power to deny or
limit access to it "for improper purposes,"5 such as gaining business
information that would put a litigant at a competitive disadvantage.5
Discovery needed less protection from non-party access because it
was not a judicial proceeding, and discovery fruits were not accessible
to non-parties.56 Access to discovery only needed protection once it
47. The Supreme Court noted in Richmond Newsps., Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 570,
580 n. 17 (1980) that "historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively
open," serving a "significant community therapeutic value."
48. Nixon v. Warner Bros. Comm., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (noting that in America,
courts presume that the public has a common law right to inspect public records and
documents).
49. Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 161.
50. Id.
51. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396 (1979).
52. Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1110, 1110 (1988).
53. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1993).
54. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
55. Id. See also Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33 n. 19 ("[A]ccess to [courthouse records]
customarily is subject to the control of the trial court.").
56. At common law, however, discovery was not a public event. Seattle Times, 467
U.S. at 33 (noting that pretrial depositions and interrogatories were not public at common
law). Moreover, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to make it so. See C.J. Burger's
concurring opinion in Gannett:
[D]uring the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enormously expanded,
it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, that a pretrial deposition or pretrial
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entered the judicial record. Once a case has been fully adjudicated
and judicial records are either returned to their owners or properly
destroyed by the clerk of court, they are no longer judicial records,
and are outside the jurisdiction of the court.57
How does the traditional common law presumption of public
access to courts and their records square with the relatively new
statutory phenomenon of "discovery?"
The Second Circuit faced this question head-on in In Re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation.8 In the original Agent Orange
suit, discovery was taken pursuant to two blanket stipulated
protective orders. The parties then settled, agreeing that all discovery
be returned to the party that originally produced it. The Agent
Orange court examined the issue of whether third party intervenes,
including the Vietnam Veterans of America and the Agent Orange
Plaintiff's Management Committee, had a right of access to all
discovery produced during the original suit. The court recognized
that per its previous interpretations of the Rules, common law
controlled. As such, discovery was not accessible to non-parties since
the discovery was never filed with the court, and thus no right of
access attached.
However, the court in Agent Orange (perhaps moved by a
perceived inequity between injured Vietnam veterans and large
manufacturers who produced dangerous chemicals that injured them
in friendly fire59), stretched to find a way to provide the non-parties
discovery access.6" The court announced that the Rules raised a
statutory presumption that discovery is public even if not filed with
the court, thus trumping the common law right of access doctrine.6'
The Agent Orange court ruled that court-sanctioned blanket
interrogatories were other than wholly private to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does
not become part of a "trial" until and unless the contents of the deposition are offered in
evidence.
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 396.
57. Littlejohn v. BIC Corp, 851 F.2d 673, 683 (3d Cir. 1988).
58. Agent Orange, 821 F.2d 139.
59. Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1114 n. 8 (quoting the district court as saying that it
"cannot ignore the might and power of the tobacco industry and its ability to resist the
individual claims asserted against it and its individual members" when denying a Rule
26(c) motion by tobacco company defendant).
60. According to the Agent Orange court, the high interest of the general public in
this public health and safety issue makes access to discovery more desirable. Agent
Orange, 821 F.2d at 146.
61. At the time, the Southern and Eastern District of New York's local rules
prohibited litigants from filing discovery materials with the court "due to the volume of
discovery materials" generated by these districts. Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 146.
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stipulated protective orders cannot overcome this statutory
presumption. Therefore, the intervenors were successful in
overcoming the stipulated protective orders and the terms of the
settlement agreement.
Agent Orange arrived at this novel statutory presumption of
open discovery by interpreting former Rule 5(d) to "embod[y] the
[Advisory] Committee's concern that class action litigants and the
general public be afforded access to discovery materials whenever
possible."62 Furthermore, a presumption of public discovery "might
undermine its primary goal of providing citizens and effective truth
seeking procedure for resolving their disputes without impairing their
other rights."63
The court interpreted former Rule 5(d) to mandate filing of
discovery materials with the clerk of court," notwithstanding a local
rule forbidding filing discovery.65 Since discovery is a matter of
"legislative grace," and not a constitutionally-protected right,6
Congress could grant access if it wanted to.67 In fact, the Second
Circuit later ruled that a local rule excusing the mandatory filing of
discovery materials under Rule 5(d) had the effect of denying the
public a "right it would otherwise have had to inspect freely the
discovery materials in this case." '  This represents a serious
misreading of the common law.
Bolstering their argument, the Agent Orange court found that
Rule 26(c)'s requirement that a movant for a protective order show
"good cause" for issuing the order69 led to the assumption that the
materials must be accessible by the public or there would be no
62. Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 146.
63. Arthur Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders and Public Access to the Courts,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 432 (1991). See also United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905
F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990).
64. "Filing; Certificate of Service. [B]ut the court may on motion of a party or on its
own initiative order that depositions upon oral examination and interrogatories, requests
for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed
unless on order of the court or for use in the proceeding. Former Rule 5(d). The Agent
Orange court found the negative pregnant requiring a court order not to file presumed that
discovery would be filed otherwise.
65. Pub. Citizen, 858 F.2d 775, 781.
66. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 20.
67. Id.
68. Pub. Citizen, 858 F.2d at 780.
69. Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145. (quoting Rule 26(c), which provides that "upon
motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause
shown, the court... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .. ")
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reason to protect them.7" :However, the Agent Orange court seems to
ignore the fact that a protective order issued under Rule 26(c) may be
issued to prevent discovery altogether,71 to restrict the discovery
methods used,72 or to protect information during and after trial.73
Thus, because the Rules required a court order or local rule to
avoid filing discovery, and a court order to maintain secrecy,
discovery must be presumed filed and part of the judicial record.
Discovery was not protected from the right of access without an
affirmative court order under 26(c), after a showing of good cause.
74
Several circuits have followed this statutory presumption, even
going so far as to rule that deponents could not reasonably rely on
protective orders to restrict access to discovery not used at trial.75
This construction of the Rules supported the Third Circuit's
increasing distrust of blanket stipulated protective orders.
Increasingly, that Circuit required an even higher standard of scrutiny
on blanket stipulated protective orders to protect the public right of
access as litigants' private confidentiality agreements. 7' This disfavor
of privacy virtually mandates a balancing test be performed by the
70. Id. at 145-46.
71. See e.g. Rule 26(c)(1): that the disclosure or discovery not be had; Rule 26(c)(4):
that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery
be limited to certain matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1), 26(c)(4) (2003).
72. See e.g. Rule 26(c)(2): that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on
specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; Rule 26(c)(5):
that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by
the party seeking discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2), 26(c)(5) (2003).
73. See e.g. Rule 26(c)(6): that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by
order of the court; Rule 26(c)(7): that a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a
designated way; Rule 26(c)(8): that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(6), 26(c)(7), 26(c)(8) (2003).
74. Circuits using the Agent Orange rationale: Citizens First Natl. Bank, 178 F.3d 943
(7th Cir.); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. D. Ct. - N.D. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096,
1103 (9th Cir. 1999) ("It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the
absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public."); Ironclad, L.P. v. Poly-
America, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10728 at *48 (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2000) (Tenth
Circuit case, citing Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145-46: "[g]enerally, the public has a right of
access to discovery materials, especially when the subject matter of the litigation is of
special public interest."); Tavoulareas v. The Washington Post, 724 F.2d 1010, 1016 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) ("Courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that the [Rules] presume
open discovery."). Although the Eighth Circuit has not explicitly decided the issue, the
court has commented in dictum, however, that "Rule 5(d) clearly contemplates that the
public has some interest in the content of documents 'required to be served ...' (N. Sts.
Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 156 F.R.D. 168, 171 (D. Minn. 1994).
75. Greater Miami, 955 F. Supp. at 40.
76. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 791-92 (3d Cir. 1994).
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court whenever parties wish to protect their discovery from non-
parties."
However, the December, 2000 revisions to the Rules has
virtually foreclosed the Agent Orange reasoning. The United
Supreme Court promulgated changes to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and submitted them to Congress in April 2000.78 While
some of the proposed amendments to the federal discovery regime
have been vigorously debated,79 the change to Rule 5(d) has gone
virtually unnoticed."0
The revised Rule 5(d) now mandates that initial disclosures and
"discovery requests and responses,"'. "must not be filed until they are
used in the action." 2 The Advisory Committee's notes on the 2000
revisions noted the costs incurred by litigants and the courts in the
filing and storage process, and meant to conform this rule to
widespread local rules forbidding discovery filing.83 The permissive
aspect of former rule 5(d), allowing local federal district courts to
77. Soon after the Pansy decision, the Third Circuit was criticized for allowing ex post
facto opening of stipulated confidentiality agreements at the expense of commercial
litigants' interests in maintaining pretrial confidentiality and lower costs. See Shannon P.
Duffy, Rules are Changed on Confidentiality; Spate of Federal Rulings Make Protective
Orders Uncertain, The Legal Intelligencer (July 11, 1994).
78. See e.g. Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal Civil Rules Amendments, 22
Cardozo L. Rev. 75 (2000) (article discusses Rule revisions generally, but does not discuss
revisions to Rule 5(d) specifically).
79. For example, revised Rule 26(a)(1) changed the requirement that a litigant only
disclose information that is "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings" to only material that "supports its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment." This change may have the effect of significantly reducing the amount of
information exchanged in mandatory disclosure. Likewise, the revised Rule substitutes a
"relevant to the claim or defense" standard for the "relevant to the subject matter"
standard. This change also narrows the scope of discoverable material, and has been
controversial. See id. at 75.
80. For a discussion of the new Rules, see Jack H. Friedenthal, Symposium: Secrecy in
Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & Policy 67 (2000).
81. Notes of Advisory Comm. on 2000 Amends., note to Subdivision 5(d).
82. Id. (emphases added). "Filing; Certificate of Service. All papers after the
complaint required to be served upon a party, together with a certificate of service, must
be filed with the court within a reasonable time after service, but disclosures under Rule
26(a)(1) or (2) and the following discovery requests and responses must not be filed until
they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing: (i) depositions, (ii)
interrogatories, (iii) requests for documents or to permit entry upon land, and (iv)
requests for admissions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (2000).
83. The Advisory Committee "recogniz[ed] the costs imposed on parties and courts
by the required filing of discovery materials that are never used in an action, Rule 5(d)
was amended in 1980 to authorize court orders that excuse filing. Since then, many
districts have adopted local rules that excuse or forbid filing." Notes of Advisory Comm.
on 2000 Amends., note to Subdivision 5(d).
2002]
override the filing requirement, was removed in the 2000 revision in
the interests of judicial economy and the benefits of a national
standard.' Thus, the revised Rule 5(d) no longer contains the
negative pregnant clauses which the Agent Orange court relied upon.
The interpretation fits the underlying reason for creating the
rules in the first instance. The 1934 Rules Enabling Act authorized
the Supreme court to "prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure.., for cases in the United States district courts," from
which flowed the Rules in 1938. The Act also provided that the
"rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right."
While increasing public access to discovery may seem like a worthy
policy goal, it both enlarges the common law right and abridges the
corollary right to privacy previously enjoyed by litigants preparing
their case. The Rules, and the statute authorizing the Rules, simply
does not support public access to discovery not part of the judicial
record.
The problem with the statutory presumption approach in
conjunction with a technical filing requirement is evident in a recent
Third Circuit decision, Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg.5 The Pansy
court was faced with the ramifications of applying the statutory
presumption to. discovery attached to a private settlement agreement
not filed with the court. The Pansy court reluctantly ruled that
documents, once filed with a settlement agreement at the clerk of
court, but returned to the parties pursuant to a stipulated protective
order, were no longer judicial records to which a common law right of
access attached.6 The court itself notes that the First Circuit's 'filed
but used for adjudicatory purposes' rule is a "persuasive and perhaps
desirable rule.
87
IV. The First Circuit's Approach: The Common Law Right of
Access Principle Makes Discovery Presumptively Confidential
The Agent Orange statutory presumption may have contributed
to the current controversy about the status of discovery in the federal
courts. The presumption of non-party access works to inadequately
84. Id. (noting that "costs and burdens would likely change as parties make increased
use of audio- and video-taped depositions. Equipment to facilitate review and
reproduction of such discovery materials may prove costly to acquire, maintain, and
operate.").
85. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 772.
86. Id. at 783 (noting the First Circuit arrived at a "desirable rule" but also found that
they were "bound by [internal rules]" to "follow the decision").
87. Id.
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protect parties in their own litigation. The heightened requirement
for showing good cause before a protective order can issue increases
the costs of pretrial litigation and creates a quagmire of balancing
factors for the district judge to consider, even in a case that will
probably never reach the trial stage.
A better approach is that used in Anderson v. Cryovac.' In
Cryovac, decided before Agent Orange, the court based its reasoning
on the implicit assumption that the Rules did not usurp the traditional
and longstanding federal common law principle of confidential
discovery. The Cryovac court reaffirmed the common law
presumption that public access to judicial records is a foundation of
the American court system, and it does not "encompass discovery
materials."' The court declined to open discovery to a right of access,
unless the discovery was used to adjudicate a substantive right,' and
therefore a part of the judicial record. Cryovac further held that "a
request to compel or protect the disclosure of information in the
discovery process is not a request for a disposition of substantive
rights."9' Discovery, and motions on discovery, were outside the right
to a presumption of access.! Keeping discovery outside the common
law right of access makes discovery more efficient, 9 perhaps because
it requires fewer pretrial motions on confidentiality. Forcing a trial
court to balance the public's right of access against litigants' concerns
of privacy cuts against modern discovery goals of efficient, speedy
resolution of civil cases.'
The First Circuit backed away from this posture9" somewhat in
Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc.96 The Public Citizen court
examined whether a blanket stipulated protective order could be
modified after the underlying case had been dismissed pursuant to a
88. See Cryovac, 805 F.2d at 13 ("There is no tradition of public access to discovery,
and requiring a trial court to scrutinize carefully public claims of access would be
incongruous with the goals of the discovery process.").
89. Id.
90. Id. at 11 ("We ... hold that there is no right of public access to documents
considered in civil discovery motions.").
91. Id. at 13 (comparing discovery motions to summary judgment motions, and
noting that a right of access attaches in summary judgment motions since substantive
rights are adjudicated in summary judgment motions).
92. Id. at 14.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 13-14.
95. Citizens First Natl. Bank, 178 F.3d at 946 (noting that the First Circuit, "which
used to endorse broad umbrella orders [citing Anderson] have moved away from that
position [citing Public Citizen]).
96. Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 789.
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.97 The court declined to agree with plaintiffs'
argument that former Rule 5(d)'s filing requirement raised a
presumption of right of access, holding that when litigants don't file
discovery materials with the court clerk, non-parties have no right to
demand access; the materials are "solely in the hands of private partylitigants.""9
However, Public Citizen agreed with Agent Orange's analysis of
Rule 26(c) requiring a good cause showing before any protective
order can issue. Public Citizen then ruled that the blanket stipulated
protective order was unsupported by a good cause showing, and
motivated it to allow parties to disseminate discovery, but right to
access discovery for non-parties.99
A final word was announced in Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v.
Greenblat." "[T]he law simply does not grant a right of access [to
unfiled discovery] to a nonparty.'. 1  Again, the First Circuit court
paid lip service to the statutory presumption possibility in dicta, 2 but
ultimately rules in favor of Cryovac approach.
The December, 2000 revision to Rule 5(d) significantly impacts
the reasoning in a case like Agent Orange."' Congress made
depositions in antitrust actions public; had they wanted it to be that
way in all civil cases, they would have explicitly done so."
Using the Cryovac rationale,' raw discovery that is not used
97. Id. at 780.
98. Id. at 790-91.
99. Id. at 791.
100. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblat, 964 F.2d 1227, 1232 (1st Cir. 1992)
("This case does not involve a right of public access, based either on the First Amendment
or the common law, to records and documents filed with the district court." (emphasis
added)).
101. Id. at 1233.
102. Id. at 1233 n. 5. ("It is, of course, possible [per Agent Orange] that, under certain
circumstances, the public may enjoy a right of access to discovery materials ... based on
[Rule] 5(d) in conjunction with [Rule] 26(c); the [petitioners have], however, launched no
such contention.").
103. Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145 (decision based on statutory construction, not
common law or constitutional grounds).
104. U.S. v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1969) (citing the Publicity
in Taking Evidence Act, 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1913)).
105. Circuits that have followed the First Circuit's approach include the Third Circuit
and the Tenth Circuit: Bank of Am. Natl. Trust & Say. Assn. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assn.,
800 F.2d 339,343 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[D]iscovery ... which is ordinarily conducted in private,
stands on a different footing than does a motion filed by a party seeking action by the
court."); Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 161-62 (in Leucadia, the Third Circuit declined to extend
common-law public access to discovery filed with pretrial discovery motions, reasoning
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remains private. Per that reasoning, courts should not scrutinize
agreements made about raw discovery not used substantively in a
judicial proceeding.
Once courts adopt the common law approach of the First Circuit,
the point at which the public right to access discovery attaches
becomes important. There are two competing ideas of when a
document can be classified a "judicial document" to which the right
of access attaches.' °6 In light of the revisions to Rule 5(d) and the
requisite rejection of the Agent Orange reasoning, the technical
approach taken by some courts should be rejected. 7 This approach
makes actual filing 8 the deciding criterion."'9 Thus the technical Rule
5(e) physical delivery requirement of materials to the court clerk,
who then dates and files the materials, should not be determinative of
when the right to access attaches.''0
A better solution is to look at what role the material in question
played"' in the adjudication process."2  The Advisory Committee
stated that "only those parts of voluminous materials that are actually
used need be filed."" 3  "In connection with proceedings in court,
that it would chill parties' filing of legitimate discovery motions); Okla. Hosp. Assn. v.
Okla. Pblg. Co., 748 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that although parties have a
"constitutionally protected right to disseminate information obtained by them through the
discovery process absent a valid protective order," non-party media do not constitute
members of the public under Seattle Times, and thus do not have standing to force party to
disseminate discovery fruits.)
106. U.S. v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141,145 (2d Cir. 1995).
107. Zenith Radio, 529 F. Supp. at 897 n. 55 ("[W]e believe that pretrial evidentiary
hearings in which rulings binding at trial are made, can fairly be said to be part of the trial
itself. In any event, we have no doubt that the presumption of openness applies as fully to
pretrial proceedings, at least in civil litigation.").
108. Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 161-62 (Filing a document with the court "gives rise to a
presumptive right of public access.").
109. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 782.
110. Rule 5(e): "Filing With the Court Defined. The filing of papers with the court as
required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of court, except that the
judge may permit the papers to be filed with the judge, in which event the judge shall note
thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 5(e).
111. Cryovac, 805 F.2d at 13; see also U.S. v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citing Cryovac).
112. Id. ("[C]ourts have not extended [the common law presumption] beyond
materials on which a court relies in determining the litigants' substantive rights.");
Amodeo, 44 F.3d at 145; Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. v. Spear, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25900 at
*12 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that "a document must play a relevant and useful
role in the adjudication process in order for the common law right of public access to
attach.").
113. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (2002) 2000 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes (italics
added).
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however, the rule is to be interpreted broadly; any use of discovery
materials in court in connection with a motion, a pretrial conference
under Rule 16, or otherwise, should be interpreted as use in the
proceeding."'' 4
This puts the decision to make discovery material accessible to
non-parties squarely in the hands of the litigants themselves. A trial
court judge may not prevent a party from filing material into the
judicial record sua sponte, "5 but when the judge's discretion is
invoked by one of the parties for good cause, he may decide to
prevent filing of documents'in a suit.1 6 Litigants, while preparing for
trial, can balance the evidentiary importance of the discovery against
any private agreements they have with their opponent, "7 and then
enter discovery onto the record.
However, once a litigant decides to use the discovery as part of
the judicial records ("all papers, exhibits, and affidavits on file with
the court'18), the common law right of access attaches, and on appeal,
the court will consider the discovery in its determination of the case."9
Under this approach, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c)12
looks only at the sufficiency of the pleadings, discovery materials filed
in support of the motion are not considered by the court in its ruling,
and are not "judicial documents.' 21 In contrast, discovery materials
supporting a summary judgment motion,22 trial transcripts and
exhibits, settlement documents, and preliminary injunction hearing
transcripts have been and should continue to be part of he judicial
record to which the right of access attaches.1 23 It is important to note
that otherwise accessible documents should not be construed as
114. Id.
115. Intl. Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1975).
116. Id. at 46.
117. Wilk, 635 F.2d at 1299.
118. Intl. Bus. Machs. Corp., 526 F.2d at 45.
119. Id.
120. Rule 12(c): "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.... If, on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56." Thus, in a pure Judgment on the Pleadings, the court
will only look at the sufficiency of the pleadings on their face; if the movant attaches, i.e.,
discovery, it becomes a Summary Judgment motion and is decided on its merits. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c) (2002).
121. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. v. Spear, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25900 at *10 (4th Cir.
1995) (finding that material filed with motion to dismiss retains discovery status and that
no common-law right of access attaches).
122. Cryovac, 805 F.2d at 13; Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982).
123. Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 163-65.
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confidential merely because they are filed with a pretrial motion. '14
This solution increases works to freely provide discovery among
parties in confidence, without having to consider a non-party gaining
access, unless and until a party enters the discovery into the judicial
record.
V. The Status of Stipulated Protective Orders Under the
Common Law Confidentiality Presumption
The principle that the Rules do not negate the common law
presumption of confidential discovery will alleviate some of the
concerns raised by the court and litigants, but it is not a cure-all. For
instance, some types of discoverable information still needs to be
protected, even when entered into the judicial record and
presumptively accessible by non-parties.
Stipulated protective orders can't survive the new rules when
they cover "judicial documents.""12 Under the Cryovac common law
approach, parties with trade secrets to protect have better reason to
rely on confidentiality during the pretrial stage. Blanket stipulated
protective orders that add no additional protection to trade secret
must be protected during the trial and after.
Therefore, parties should look to Rule 26(c) for protection of
discovery entered into the trial record. It is here that the common
law right of access attaches, as well as First Amendment
considerations. 6 Because the court has the power under Rule 26(c)
to prevent discovery or to order that discovery be protected from
disclosure, this Rule does raise the presumption that a showing of
good cause will prevent disclosure even after discovery enters the trial
record.
Rule 26(c) anticipates that parties will have to show good cause
for at least some classes of material,'27 if not a document-by-document
124. Id. at 162 (documents filed with motion to compel discovery presumptively public
under common law right of access).
125. See e.g., Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 184 F.R.D. 504, 506
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stipulated protective order not granted for covered judicial documents,
including trial testimony).
126. This was the situation in Cipollone:
[I]t appears.., that confidentiality was maintained during the initial phase of the litigation
by tacit mutual understanding and that it was only when plaintiffs' counsel evinced an
intention to use the material beyond the confines of the litigation that the protective order
phase of the litigation began.
Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1110 n. 1.
127. For example, parties would likely have to show good cause to protect any
revelation of trade secrets entered into the trial record.
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showing. Rule 26(c) should not be construed so far as to permit
blanket stipulations, in good faith, that all discovery is protectable.
Parties must be required to show good cause before a protective
order is issued.'28 The party seeking a Rule 26(c) protective order has
the burden 129 to prove that good cause exists,'3° and that it outweighs
the opponent's showing that the material is sufficiently necessary and
relevant to his case to outweigh the harm of disclosure. "' Broad
allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or
articulate reasoning, do not support a finding of good cause.132
Courts purport to hold parties to the '"good cause" standard
when negotiating a stipulated protective order between themselves33
through affidavits.'3" Parties entering into a protective order without
an explicit judicial finding of good cause do so at the risk of having
the evidence unsealed..' However, the good cause standard is usually
applied retroactively. District courts should refrain from adding
clauses into blanket stipulated protective orders reserving the right to
demand a good cause showing.'36 Rule 26(c) clearly demands that
good cause be shown before the protective order is issued.'37
Where possible, a document-by-document approach should be
128. "Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought ... and for good cause shown ... the court in the district where the
deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party [for
specified reasons]." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (2002).
129. Penthouse Int'l v. Playboy, 663 F.2d 371, 391 (2d Cir. 1981).
130. In re Wilson, 149 F.3d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1998).
131. Id. at 252-53 (disclosure of defendant's trade secret so vital to plaintiff's case,
outweighs harm to defendant).
132. USA Tech., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8120 at *1.
133. See e.g. Makar-Wellbon v. Song Electronics, 187 F.R.D. 576 (E.D.Wisc. 1999)
(blanket stipulated protective order denied because "good cause" specifically demanded
by federal rule, even in agreement between parties).
134. One conclusory affidavit is "insufficient to establish good cause" under 26(c). See
In re Exxon Valdez, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7999 at *5 (D. Alaska 1990). Contra. In re
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(upholding stipulated protective order for 100,000 documents on affidavit "describing
general terms the negative effect release of the materials as a whole" would have on Mobil
Corp.'s business).
135. Greater Miami, 955 F. Supp. at 40 (deponents not justified in assuming
confidentiality will be maintained without a good cause determination by the court).
136. District Focus: Judges Reserve Right to Quash Protective Order, 2 Fed. Discovery
News (June 1996) (quoting judges who insert "subject to public policy and other
considerations" or "subject to being modified or vacated by me for good cause shown"
into stipulated protective orders).
137. "[U]pon motion ... and for good cause shown ... the court... may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party .. " Rule 26(c).
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adopted. '38 This would affirmatively place the:burden on and increase
litigation costs for the party seeking protection, but this is preferable
as opposed to placing the burden on the party seeking disclosure.
When such an approach is not feasible, a court should look at
protecting classes of documents.'
Requiring an affirmative good cause showing before a court
issues a Rule 26(c) protective order would significantly reduce the
necessity of blanket stipulated protective orders. Furthermore, it
would require the district to employ the discretion demanded of it by
the Rules and reduce appellate modification or overruling.
VI. Conclusion
Stipulated blanket protective orders serve an important function
for litigants and court in modern federal pretrial practice. But they
have developed largely in response to an increasing view that raw
discovery fruits are presumptively accessible to non-parties.
The revision to the Rules, however, have reduced their necessity
by foreclosing a statutory presumption of discovery accessibility, and
reaffirming the longstanding common law rule of right of access to
the judicial record only.
Holding non-party access to the judicial record, however, is not
the full answer for litigants who have trade secrets to protect-but a
well-supported Rule 26(c) protective order, issued after a good cause
showing to the court, is presumptively valid and less likely to be
modified later.
Taken together, these approaches to non-party access to
discovery materials will ensure that parties can rely on the protection
they need during litigation.
138. Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1123 (in dictum, advocating this approach for cases where
court suspects litigant's confidentiality designations are spurious). But see Greater Miami,
955 F. Supp. at 39 (after giving confidentiality order over deposition little weight, the court
notes that if "courts were obliged to make determinations, item by item, as to the
justification for confidentiality of every piece of evidence as to which any party or witness
made such a claim ... there would be little time in which to do anything else.").
139. The Seventh Circuit's insistence on a good cause showing has been reflected in
their district decisions. See e.g. Makar-Wellbon, 187 F.R.D. at 577-78 (blanket stipulated
protective order denied, but court notes a protective order would be granted with "a more
specific description of the individual documents or categories of documents they seek to
protect.").
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